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1. SUMMARY: Whether a bankruptcy court in a Chapter 11 
reorganization proceeding may compel the Government to turn over 
property to the debtor-in-possession, where the Government has seized 
the property by levy prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petn to 
satisfy the debtor's delinquent federal tax liabilities. 
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2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Resp is a corporation 
involved in installing and servicing swimming pools. During 1978 and 
1979 the Government made several assessments against resp for unpaid 
wi_thholding and employment taxes that it concededly owed in the amount 
of approximately $92,000 plus interest. On January 14, 1981, the IRS, 
acting pursuant to §63311 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 
lawfully levied upon resp's "inventory, equipment, and other tangible 
property." The next day, resp filed a petn for reorganization under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and was continued as "debtor-in-
possession." The IRS soon commenced an adversary proceeding in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court, seeking a determination that the 
automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy law (11 u.s.c. (Supp. IV) 
362) was inapplicable to its proposed sale of the seized property, or 
that it be permitted to sell the seized property. Resp 
counterclaimed, seeking an order directing the United States to turn 
2 
over the seized property to it pursuant to §542 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
lFor the full text of §6331, see Pet. App., at 54a-55a. 
2§542 provides in relevant part: 
~ 
Turnover of property to the estate. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of 
this section, an entity, other than a custodian, in 
possess ion, custody, or control, during the case, of 
property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under 
section 363 of this title • • • , shall deliver to the 
trustee, and account for, such property or the value of 
such property •••• " 
( For the full text of §363, see Pet. App., at 52a. 
'-.__-. 
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The bankruptcy court (WDNY Hayes) ordered the United States 
---===--==>----=--= 
to deliver to resp the property under its control, subject to resp's 
paying the Government $20,000 to protect its interest in the seized 
property. 3 Although foreclosed from relying on §542 by an earlier 
decision by the WDNY, the bankruptcy court held that the United States 
was a "custodian" within the meaning of §543 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
and thus was required to deliver the "property of the debtor" to the 
debtor-in-possession. 4 
On appeal, the DC (WDNY, Elfin) reversed. The government is 
not a "custodian" of resp's property within the meaning of §543, and 
the WDNY had recently decided that §542 did not permit the bankruptcy 
court to act as it had, either. 
/ 
3. DECISION BELOW: The CA 2 reversed the DC. It noted 
that the question has generated a great deal of conflict among the 
bankruptcy judges ~district courts. See Pet. App., at la, n.l. 
also noted that t~e CA 4 had recently addressed the question and 
decided that bankruptcy courts cannot order the IRS to turn over 
. ·. : ~·· 
3Although the property in resp's hands as a going concern was 
valued at $162,876, expert testimony fixed its sale value at 
between $35,000 and $20,000. 
4§543 (b) provides, in relevant part: 
A custodian shall--
(1) deliver to the trustee any property of the 
debtor transferred to such custodian, or proceeds of 
such property, that is in the custodian's possession, 
custody, or control on the date that such custodian 




property seized prior to the filing of a reorganization petition to 
satisfy tax liabilities. Cross Electric, Inc. v. United States, 664 
F.2d 1218 (CA4 1981). "We find the issue more difficult than did the \ 
Fo_urth Circu~CA 2 said, "and, conceding the question to be a close 
one, reach an opposite result." 
First:the CA 2 rejected the grounds relied on by the 
Bankruptcy Court in ordering the turnover. Although §543 (b) directs 
a "custodian" to "deliver to the trustee any property of the debtor 
transferred to such custodian ••• ," §101 (10) defines a "custodian" as 
a person who acts as "a trustee, receiver, or agent." 5 Because the 
IRS is "the archetypical 'adverse claimant,' see Phelps v. United 
States, 421 u.s. 330, 334 (1975) ," it is none of these. 
But theCA 2 decided that §542 authorized the turnover. 
__.J- -
That section requires the turnover "of property that the trustee may 
use, sell or lease under section 363 •••• " Section 363 (c) (1) 
permits the trustee--or debtor-in-possession--to use, sell or lease 
"property of the estate" in the ordinary course of business, although 
§363 (e) creates a mechanism whereby an entity with an interest in the 
property can seek an order limiting such use, sale or lease to the 
extent necessary _to protect :_. i ts interest. Section 541 (a) (l) 
provides that an estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable 
interests of the' debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case." 6 
5For the relevant portions of §101 (10), see Pet. App., at 
6a, n. 3. 
Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages. 
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The Government argued to CA 2--as it argues here--that the 
plain meaning of these sections mandates the conclusion reached by the 
~
CA4: the Bankruptcy Code does not permit a bankruptcy court to order 
th~ IRS to turn over to a debtor property that the IRS had lawfully 
seized--prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petn--to satisfy a tax 
assessment. The "property of the estate" that must be turned over 
under §542 consists only of any interests in property belonging to the 
debtor as of the time it filed its petn in bankruptcy. At the time 
this bankruptcy petn was filed, the only interests the debtor had in 
the seized property were those set forth in §6331 et seq. of the IRC 
(a right to notice of seizure and sale, a right to redemption prior to 
sale, and a right to surplus proceeds). Only those interests were 
part of the "property of the estate," and turnover of those interests 
would be inappropriate because the debtor-in-possession could not 
"use, sell or lease" them. All other interests in the property--
including the right to possession--are held by the IRS. 
Although recognizing the "force" in the Government's ~ S J 
construction, the CA 2 disagreed. Upon reviewing the history of the ~ 
bankruptcy code and the "structure of the statute," it rejected the 
Government's "mechanical" interpretation. This was principally 
because the Government's construction of the interplay between §542 
and §541 (a) (l)'s definition of "property of the estate" threatened 
to deprive trustees or debtors in reorganization proceedings of the 
power not only to obtain turnover of property levied upon by the IRS, 





"but also that repossessed prior to bankruptcy by secured creditors or 
held by pledgees after a default." In these situations, the secured 
creditor, like the IRS, typically has rightful possession of the 
property and the debtor has just such rights as are provided the tax 
debtor under IRC §6331 et seq. Under the Government's theory, these 
limited interests would not be turned over to the trustee or debtor-
in-possession, either. 
This result would be "a significant departure" from 
treatment of reorganization proceedings under the former bankruptcy 
act. Section 257 of Chapter X of that Act provided that the "trustee 
or debtor in possession shall have the right to immediate 
possession of all property of the debtor in the possession of a 
trustee under a trust deed or a mortgagee under a mortgage." On the 
basis of that section, and the overall structure of the old act, the 
courts had conferred on the bankruptcy courts broad power to order 
secured creditors in possession following the debtor's default to turn 
over the collateral. See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Kaplan, 185 
F.2d 791 (CAl 1950). To remove this power from the bankruptcy courts 
would severely limit th~ chances of success in many reorganizations. 
If Congress hqd set out to make so serious a change in the 
. ~ 
bankruptcy laws, it would have explicitly said so. Given that 
principle, and Congress' clear intent to encourage reorganizations 
under the new Code, the CA2 held that the turnover power recognized in 
Reconstruction Finance was included in §542. The CA 2 also relied on 
the fact that §542 first appeared in the proposed new Code after 
several witnesses had testified that the power to order the turnover 




An IRS levy on tangible property is "virtually 
indistinguishable from the ordinary repossession and foreclosure 
procedures followed by secured creditors." It is true that under the 
old bankruptcy act property held by an assignee of the debtor but 
levied upon by the IRS for satisfaction of a tax lien was not subject 
to the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Phelps v. United 
States, 421 u.s. 330 (1975). But Phelps dealt with the distinction 
between summary and plenary jurisdiction under the old act, a 
distinction that the new Code abolishes. "[I]t is far from clear that 
under the [new] Code a bankruptcy court would not have power to order 
a turnover on the same facts as Phelps." Moreover, Phelps was a 
liquidation, not a reorganization case. Even under the old act the 
bankruptcy court had greater power over creditors, and over the 
collateral in their possession, in reorganization than in liquidation 
proceedings. Under the old act, 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ,3.05, at 431 
(14th ed. 1977), and continued in the new Code as established above, 
the turnover power extends to all property in which the debtor has 
title. It is well established that when the IRS levies upon property 
it does not divest title. Bennett v. Hunter, 76 u.s. (9 Wall.) 326, 
336-37 (1870). But see United States v. Phelps, supra, 421 u.s., at 
337, n.S. Therefore, the turnover power extends to 




reorganization is successful, not only is Congress' policy in the 
Bankruptcy Code--emphasizing utilization of reorganization to save 
businesses and jobs--fulfilled, but the IRS stands to gain repayment 
of all--not just some--of the taxes owed. Moreover, the Government's 
substantial interest in prompt payment of taxes--particularly 
- 8 -
important when, as here, the deficiency relates to amounts withheld 
from the wages of employees in satisfaction of their taxes--can be 
safeguarded by the protections a bankruptcy court can provide. 
In light of the lapse of one year since the bankruptcy court 
had dealt with the case, and possible changed circumstances, the C~ 2 
remanded to the bankruptcy court to reconsider whether a turnover was 
appropriate in these circumstances, and if so, what protection to 
provide to the United States. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that--as CA2 admitted--this 
decision squarely conflicts with the recent decision of CA4. 
Moreover, as theCA 2 accurately observed, the lower federal courts 
are also divided on this question. The issue is important, and this 
Court's intervention is required to ensure a uniform national rule 
governing the relationship of the bankruptcy laws to the Government's 
statutory authority to collect delinquent taxes. 
Moreover, petr argues, as it did below, that theCA 2's 
interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, which 
limits the turnover power to "the property of the estate," and then 
defines "the property of the estate" as including "all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement 
of the case." This plain language and the House and Senate Reports 
that accompanied it make clear that the debtor's interests as of the 
time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy are not expanded by 
the filing of the petition. 
The bankruptcy code itself does not define the property 
interests of the debtor: instead, these are determined by reference to 
non-bankruptcy law, here the IRC. Before the bankruptcy petition is 
- 9 -
filed, an entity levied upon to satisfy delinquent taxes has rights 
only to notice, to redemption by paying the amount of the tax due, and 
to any surplus achieved through sale. The filing of the bankruptcy 
petition does not expand those rights into rights to turnover of the 
property upon payment of bond. 
Moreover, even assuming that CA2 was correct that Congress 
silently "incorporated" the case law under former §257 into the new 
Code, it was erroneous to extend the turnover authority to reach 
property seized by pre-petition tax levy. CA2's theory was that 
Congress would not have changed prior law without explicitly stating 
that it was doing so. But this rationale does not explain this case, 
because under prior law, property seized by a pre-petition tax levy 
was not subject to the bankruptcy courts' turnover authority either in 
liquidating bankruptcies, Phelps v. United States, supra, or in 
reorganization proceedings, In re Pittsburgh Penguins Partners, 598 
F.2d 1299 (CA3 1979). The Committee that summarized the tax effects 
of the proposed bankruptcy legislation did not mention that the law 
would change this important and well-settled result. The same 
principle cited by the CA2, therefore--that a major change from prior 
law is not to be inferred without a clear statement thereof--requires 
that its decision be reversed. 
5. DISCUSSION: 
~ ~ 
The Government makes a powerful argument 
that this case should be granted. The conflict between this decision 
and that of the CA 4 in Cross Electric Co. is square, as the CA 2 
recognized. The issue seems to be important, judging not only from 
the number of recent lower court decisions that have confronted it, 
but also from the degree to which the power to order the turnover of 
.... 
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property in this situation is important to successful reorganizations, 
and harmful to the IRS's efforts promptly to collect taxes. 
The decision is interlocutory because CA 2 remanded for 
consideration of whether to order the Government to turn over the 
property and for consideration of what protection to afford the 
Government if turnover is required. If the bankruptcy court reverses 
its prior order to turn over the property, the issue could be avoided. 
Given the bankruptcy court's clear desire to order the Government to 
turn the property over, however, it appears unlikely that the issue 
will go away. The case--and resp's reorganization and the 
Government's collection of taxes--would then be delayed for another 
round of appeals. Despite this case's interlocutory posture, 
therefore, given the importance of the issue and the clear conflict, 
the Court may wish to grant the petition. 
6. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend CFR, with a view toward a 
grant. 
There is no response. 
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vffiiTING POOLS, INC. 
Motion of the Parties to Dispense with 
Printing the Joint Appendix 
SUMMARY: With consent of resp, the SG as petr seeks leave to dispense 
with the printing of a joint appendix. 
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS: The question presented is whether a bankruptcy 
court in a reorganization proceeding under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 
may compel the government to turn over property to the debtor-in-r.:ossession, 
where the government had seized the property by levy to satisfy the debtor's 
delinquent federal tax liabilities prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petn. 
Because the question presented is purely legal, the SG anticipates that 
the Court will not need to consider any other portions of the record than the 
opinions already appended to the cert petn. 
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United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. 
April 17, 1983 
Questions Presented 
Whether a bankruptcy court in a reorganization proceeding 
under Chapter 11 may compel the Government to turn over property 
to the trustee, where the Government had seized the property bv 
levy prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition to satisfy 
the debtor's delinquent federal tax liabilities. 
2. 
I. Background 
On Jan. 14, 1981, the IRS seized all of resp Whiting Pools' 
tangible property. (The IRS's power of levv derives from 26 
o.s.c. §6331.) The estimated value of the property as used by 
resp as a going concern was $162,000; its value if sold was be-
tween $20,000-$35,000. The IRS lien was for $92,000, plus inter-
est -- the amount of resp's unpaid withholding and FICA taxes. 
The next day resp filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code and was continued as a debtor in possession. 
Onder the Code, the filing of a petition automatically stays dis-
position of the debtor's property. §362. The IRS filed an ac-
tion in bankruptcy court, seeking a ruling that would permit it 
to sell the levied property. Resp filed a counterclaim asking 
the court to order the IRS to turn over the property to the 
trustee under §542. Both parties agreed that the crucial issue 
was whether the property had to be turned over: if it did, the 
stay would be continued; if it did not, there was no point in 
continuing the stay. ,__--
The ~nkruptcy court ordered the turnover; the district 
court (WDNY, Elfin, J.) reversed. 
z-
Then CA2 (Friendly, Oakes, 
Pierce) reversed, reinstating the turnover order. This Court 
granted cert because of a conflict between CA2 and CA4. 
II. Discussion 
There are~o central issues in the case. The first, and 
broad, question is~ether property repossessed by a secured 
creditor prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition is sub-
3. 
ject to the Bankruptcy Code's turnover requirement. If all such 
property is exempt from turnover, then it follows that property 
subject to an IRS tax 1 ien also is not subject to turnover. I£ 
property in the possession of a secured creditor is subject to 
turnover, then th~nd qu~ must be reached: whether 
property seized under an IRS tax levy should be treated differ-
ently from property seized by ordinary secured creditors. 
I recommend affirmance of CA2. I think that repossessed 
property held by secured creditors is subject to turnover. The 
second question is much closer, but I conclude that property lev---ied by the IRS should not be treated differently fro~roperty --held as collateral by secured creditors. 
A 
Section 542 provides: 
"§542. Turnover of property to the estate 
(a} Except as provided in subsection (c) or 
(d) of this section, an entity, other than a 
custodian, in possession, custody, or control, 
during the case, of property that the trustee 
may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of 
this title, or that the debtor may exempt 
under section 552 of this title, shall deliver 
to the trustee, and account for, such property 
or the value of such property, unless such 
property is of inconsequential value or bene-
fit to the estate." 
The property that must be turned over is defined as the property 
that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under §363. Section 363 
provides that the trustee may use, sell, or lease "property of 
the estate," §36 3 (b} , provided that other parties' interests in 
the property are given "adequate protection," §363(e}. The key 
phrase is "property of the estate," which is de£ ined in §5 41 
4. 
(a) (1) to mean "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property 7 f the commencement of the case." 
The Government's principal position is based on a "plain 
meaning" construction of these provisions: Section 542 requires 
turnover of "property of the estate." The property of the estate 
is determined "as of the commencement of the case." It therefore 
is necessary to analyze the status of resp' s interests in the 
property as of the date the petition was filed. Under §6331 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, the delinquent taxpayer has only the 
following limited rights in the seized property: right to notice 
of the seizure and sale, right to redeem prior to sale by full 
payment of the taxes and the expenses of the levy, and right to 
the surplus of proceeds from the sale. Under §541, then, these 
property interest belonged to the estate. But the right to pos-
sess and use the property did not belong to resp as of the date 
the petition was filed, and therefore the property did not have 
to be turned over. 
CA2 conceded that the Government's argument has "some 
force," but rejected it because of its broad implications. Judge 
Friendly noted that the Government's theory would apply as well 
to a.!..l property "repossess~ prior~ bankruptcv by secur~d cred- ( r-
itors or held by pledgees after a default." (Pet. App. at 13a.) 
~---------------------Yet in Chapter 10 reorganization proceedings under the prior 
Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy court had power to order secured 
creditors in possession to turn over their collateral. Thus, the 
reading urged by the Government would be a major change in the 
law. CA2 found no indications that Congress intended this re-
·. 
5. 
sult: "[W]e do not believe that nearly 50 years of the law of 
reorganization would have heen changed without some clear 
statement to that effect. This is particularly true because the 
Government's reading would seriously af feet the chances of 
success in many reorganizations." (Id., at 16a.) 
CA2 then found that the legislative history strongly sup-
ported a broad reading of §542's turnover power. Witness after ~ 
witness testified that the bankruptcy court had to be able to 
order turnover of collateral of secured creditors in possession. 
And it was shortly after this congressional testimony that §542 
was added to the proposed legislation. Finally, CA2 stated that 
if the Government's argument is correct, §542's turnover author-
ity amounts to very little: "[A]pparently its only use would be 
to authorize obtaining property from persons in wrongful posses-
sion following theft or conversion." (Id., at 23a.). 
I find CA2's argument persuasive, particularly the point 
that Congress should not be presumed silently to have eliminated ~ 
an important power of bankruptcy courts. The existence of this 
turnover power in reorganization proceedings was settled, the 
leading case being Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Kaplan, 185 
F.2d 791, 794 (CAl 1950): "In contrast with the provisions~ 
law relating to straight bankruptcy, Chapter X ••• contemplates 
the rehabilitation of financially ailing business corporations 
under plans of reorganization which may deal with claims of cred-
itors, secured as well as unsecured, and embrace all of the debt-
or's property, however encumbered with outstanding security in-
terests." In 1975 many witnesses testified as to the importance 
. •' 
6. 
of this power, and the SG has cited none arguing that such a pow-
er was unwarranted or should be eliminated. Section 542 followed 
on the heels of this testimony. Given this background, I cannot 
believe that Congress intended to repeal this authority. Under 
the SG's view, which admittedly is supported by the literal terms 
of the statute, the only things to be turned over are the partic-
ular limited interests (e.g., right to notice before a sale) the 
debtor retains in encumbered property. It makes little sense, 
however, to talk of "turning over" such intangibles. I therefore 
would reject the SG's narrow definition of "property of the es-
tate," and hold that Congress intended §542 to authorize the -
turnover of tangible property still owned by the debtor but in 
the possession of a secured creditor. 
The more difficult 
B ~ 
t . ~ h h ques 10n 1s w et er an IRS tax levy 
should be treated differently from the interests of secured cred-
i tors in possession. The SG emphasizes that an IRS tax levy 
"virtually transfers ownership of seized property to the govern-
ment," Brief at 25, that "[t]here are sharp differences between 
the consensual relationship of a private creditor and his debtor, 
and the involuntary relationship of the government and a delin-
quent taxpayer," id., at 36, and that the .Federal Government has 
more extensive remedies for collecting debts than do private 
creditors. CA2, on the other hand, found that an IRS levy "is 
virtually indistinguishable from the ordinary repossession and ~ 
foreclosure procedures followed by secured creditors, except for 
the fact that the IRS can make its own levy without need of the 
l .. ~ 
7. 
assistance of a sheriff/ " (Pet. App. at 23a-24a.) 
I agree with CA2. When a secured creditor exercises his 
right of repossession, he obtains essentially the same rights 
over the property as does the IRS -- ownership may be "virtually 
transferred" from the debtor to the creditor. And although the 
SG is correct that tax liability to the IRS differs from a con-
tractual liability to a creditor, I do not see why this differ-
ence should lead to a different turnover rule. The peculiar in-
terests of the IRS appropriately may be considered by the trustee 
in deciding what constitutes "adequate protection" of its inter-
ests under §3n3(e). But I am not convinced that Congress would 
want the IRS to be able to keep its levied property entirely out 
of the reorganziation process when other secured creditors must 
turn their repossessed property over to the trustee. 
The SG relies heavily on~lps v. United States, 421 u.s. 
330 (1975), for the proposition that tax-levied property does not 
have to be turned over. In Phelps a delinquent taxpayer han as-
signed property to a third party, which had converted the proper-
ty to cash. The IRS filed a notice of tax lien and levied on the 
funds in the assignee's hands. An involuntary bankruptcy peti-
tion subsequently was filed against the taxpayer, and the receiv-
er sought to force the assignee to turn over the cash. This 
Court held that the bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction to 
order the turnover. In so holding, the Court found that the levy 
gave the u.s. "full legal right" to the amount levied. 421 u.s., 
at 337. 
The significance of this case is doubtful. Certain language 
8. 
used by the Court suggests a view that mere notice of a tax levy 
vests legal title in the United States, which might suggest that 
IRS tax levies do differ from other rights of secured creditors. 
But, as CA2 found, the particular holding in Phelps is not rele-
vant, because it dealt with a now defunct distinction between 
summary and plenary bankruptcy ~urisdiction. The Court deter-
mined that the assignee was holding the funds for the Government, 
and followed the rule that "where possession is assertedly held 
not for the bankrupt but for others prior to bankruptcy .•. the 
holder is not subject to summary jurisdiction." Id., at 335-336. 
It is significant that this rule apparently would apply as well 
to property held for a private third party, i.e., a secured cred-
itor. Moreover, Phelps involved a liquidation bankruptcy, not a 
reorganization proceeding -- and the turnover rule recognized in 
cases such as RPC v. Kaplan, supra, was based expressly on the 
particular need for turnover in reorganization cases. In sum, I 
do not think Phelps provides much support for the view that the 
IRS is free from the turnover authority of a trustee in a reorga-
nization proceeding. 
I should add that I am not entirely at rest on the above 
analysis. The SG makes a reasonable argument that even if the 
Court finds that Congress intended to continue the preexisting 
rule on turnovers by secured creditors in possession, there is no 
reason to imply such a rule as to the IRS because there was no 
clearly established prior rule to that effect. But as of now I 
am persuaded by CA2's analysis that the rule should encompass all 
similar security interests. 
9. 
III. Conclusion 
I recommend that CA2 be affirmed, on the same reasoning used 
by CA2. "Property of the estate" subject to turnover incluoes 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 8~215 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
WHITING POOLS, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1983] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Promptly after the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Serv-
ice) seized respondent's property to satisfy a tax lien, re-
spondent filed a petition for reorganization under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Bankruptcy Code." The issue before us is whether § 542(a) 
of that Code authorized the Bankruptcy Court to subject the 
IRS to a turnover order with respect to the seized property. 
I 
A 
Respondent Whiting Pools, Inc., a corporation, sells, in-
stalls, and services swimming pools and related equipment 
and supplies. As of January 1981, Whiting owed approxi-
mately $92,000 in Federal Insurance Contribution Act taxes 
and federal taxes withheld from its employees, but had failed 
to respond to assessments and demands for payment by the 
IRS. As a consequence, a tax lien in that amount attached 
to all of Whiting's property.' 
'Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 6321, 
provides: 
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same 
after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United States 
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On January 14, 1981, the Service seized Whiting's tangible 
personal property-equipment, vehicles, inventory, and of-
fice supplies-pursuant to the levy and distraint provision 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 2 According to 
uncontroverted findings, the estimated liquidation value of 
the property seized was, at most, $35,000, but its estimated 
going-concern value in Whiting's hands was $162,876. The 
very next day, January 15, Whiting filed a petition for re-
organization, under the Bankruptcy Code's Chapter 11, 11 
U. S. C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V), in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New 
York. Whiting was continued as debtor-in-possession. 3 
The United States, intending to proceed with a tax sale of 
the property, 4 moved in the Bankruptcy Court for a declara-
tion that the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code, § 362(a), is inapplicable to the IRS or, in the alterna-
upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belong-
ing to such person." 
2 Section 6331 of that Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6331 provides: 
"(a) Authority of Secretary 
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same 
within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary 
to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the 
expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property ... 
belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter 
for the payment of such tax. . . . 
"(b) Seizure and sale of property 
"The term 'levy' as used in this title includes the power of distraint and 
seizure by any means. . . . In any case in which the Secretary may levy 
upon property or rights to property, he may seize and sell such property or 
rights to property (whether real or personal, tangible or intangible)." 
3 With certain exceptions not relevant here, a debtor-in-possession, 
such as Whiting, performs the same functions as a trustee in a reorganiza-
tion. 11 U. S. C. § 1107(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). 
• Section 6335, as amended, of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6335, pro-
vides for the sale of seized property after notice. The taxpayer is entitled 
to any surplus of the proceeds of the sale. § 6342(b). 
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tive, for relief from the stay. Whiting counterclaimed for an 
order requiring the Service to turn the seized property over 
to the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 542(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 5 Whiting intended to use the property in its 
reorganized business. 
B 
The Bankruptcy Court determined that the IRS was bound 
by the automatic stay provision. In re Whiting Pools, Inc., 
10 B. R. 755 (1981). Because it found that the seized prop-
erty was essential to Whiting's reorganization effort, it re-
fused to lift the stay. Acting under § 543(b)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 6 rather than under § 542(a), the court directed 
the IRS to turn the property over to Whiting on the condition 
that Whiting provide the Service with specified protection for 
its interests. 10 B. R., at 760-761. 7 
5 Section 542(a) provides in relevant part: 
"[A]n entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or control, 
during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under 
section 363 of this title, or that the debtor may exempt under section 522 of 
this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the 
value of such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value or 
benefit to the estate." 11 U. S. C. § 542(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). 
6 Section 543(b)(1) requires a custodian to "deliver to the trustee any 
property of the debtor transferred to such custodian, or proceeds of such 
property, that is in such custodian's possession, custody, or control on the 
date that such custodian acquires knowledge of the commencement of the 
case." 
The Bankruptcy Court declined to base the turnover order on § 542(a) 
because it felt bound by In re Avery Health Center, Inc ., 8 B. R. 1016 
(WDNY 1981) (§ 542(a) does not draw into debtor's estate property seized 
by IRS prior to filing of petition). 
7 Section 363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on re-
quest of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or 
proposed to be used, sold, or leased by the trustee, the court shall prohibit 
or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate 
protection of such interest. In any hearing under this section, the trustee 
•. 
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The United States District Court reversed, holding that a 
turnover order against the Service was not authorized by ei-
ther§ 542(a) or§ 543(b)(1). App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 
turn, reversed the District Court. 674 F. 2d 144 (1982). It 
held that a turnover order could issue against the Service 
under § 542(a), and it remanded the case for reconsideration 
of the adequacy of Bankruptcy Court's protection conditions. 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its ruling was con-
trary to that reached by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit in Cross Electric Co. v. United States, 
664 F. 2d 1218 (1981), and noted confusion on the issue among 
bankruptcy and district courts. 674 F. 2d, at 145 and n. 1. 
We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict in an important 
area of the law under the new Bankruptcy Code. 459 U. S. 
- (1982). 
II 
By virtue of its tax lien, the Service holds a secured in-
terest in Whiting's property. We first examine whether 
§ 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code generally authorizes the 
turnover of property of a debtor seized by a secured creditor 
prior to the commencement of reorganization proceedings. 
Section 542(a) requires an entity in possession of "property 
that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under § 363" to deliver 
that property to the trustee. Subsections (b) and (c) of§ 363 
authorize the trustee to use, sell, or lease any "property of 
the estate," subject to certain conditions for the protection of 
has the burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection." 11 U. S. C. 
§ 363(e) (1976 ed., Supp. V). 
Pursuant to this section, the Bankruptcy Court set the following conditions 
to protect the tax lien: Whiting was to pay the Service $20,000 before the 
turnover occurred; Whiting also was to pay $1,000 a month until the taxes 
were satisfied; the IRS was to retain its lien during this period; and if 
Whiting failed to make the payments, the stay was to be lifted. 10 B. R., 
at 761. 
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creditors with an interest in the property. Section 541(a)(l) 
defines the "estate" as "comprised of all the following prop-
erty, wherever located: (1) ... all legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case." Although these statutes could be read to limit the es-
tate to those "interests of the debtor in property" at the time 
of the filing of the petition, we view them as a definition of 
what is included in the estate, rather than as a limitation. 
A 
In proceedings under the reorganization provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, a troubled enterprise may be restructured 
to enable it to operate successfully in the future. Until the 
business can be reorganized pursuant to a plan under 11 
U. S. C. §§ 1121-1129 (1976 ed., Supp. V), the trustee or 
debtor-in-possession is authorized to manage the property of 
the estate and to continue the operation of the business. See 
§ 1108. By permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated 
that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy 
creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its owners. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 220 (1977). Congress presumed 
that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used 
in a rehabilitated business than if "sold for scrap." Ibid. 
The reorganization effort would have small chance of success, 
however, if property essential to running the business were 
excluded from the estate. See 6 J. Moore & L. King, Collier 
on Bankruptcy~ 3.05, p. 431 (14th ed. 1978). Thus, to facili-
tate the rehabilitation of the debtor's business, all the debt-
or's property must be included in the reorganization estate. 
This authorization extends even to property of the estate 
in which a creditor has a secured interest. § 363(b) and (c); 
see H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 182 (1977). Although Con-
gress might have safeguarded the interests of secured credi-
tors outright by excluding from the estate any property sub-
ject to a secured interest, it chose instead to include such 
property in the estate and to provide secured creditors with 
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"adequate protection" for their interests. § 363(e), quoted in 
n. 7, supra. At the secured creditor's insistence, the bank-
ruptcy court must place such limits or conditions on the trust-
ee's power to sell, use, or lease property as are necessary 
to protect the creditor. The creditor with a secured interest 
in property included in the estate must look to this provision 
for protection, rather than to the nonbankruptcy remedy of 
possession. 
Both the congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations 
and Congress' choice of methods to protect secured creditors 
suggest that Congress intended a broad range of property to 
be included in the estate. 
B 
The statutory language reflects this view of the scope of 
the estate. As noted above, § 541(a) provides that the "es-
tate is comprised of all the following property, wherever lo-
cated: . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U. S. C. 
§ 541(a)(l). 8 The House and Senate Reports on the Bank-
8 Section 541(a)(1) speaks in terms of the debtor's "interests ... in prop-
erty," rather than property in which the debtor has an interest, but this 
choice of language was not meant to limit the expansive scope of the sec-
tion. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to exclude 
from the estate property of others in which the debtor had some minor in-
terest such as a lien or bare legal title. See 124 Cong. Rec. 32399, 32417 
(1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); id., at 33999, 34016-34017 (remarks of 
Sen. DeConcini); cf. § 541(d) (property in which debtor holds legal but not 
equitable title, such as a mortgage in which debtor retained legal title to 
service or to supervise servicing of mortgage, becomes part of estate only 
to extent of legal title); 124 Cong. Rec. 33999 (1978) (remarks of Sen. De-
Concini) (§ 541(d) "reiterates the general principle that where the debtor 
holds bare legal title without any equitable interest, . . . the estate ac-
quires bare legal title without any equitable interest in the property''). 
Similar statements to the effect that § 541(a)(1) does not expand the rights 
of the debtor in the hands of the estate were made in the context of describ-
ing the principle that the estate succeeds to no more or greater causes of 
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ruptcy Code indicate that § 541(a)(l)'s scope is broad. 9 Most 
important, in the context of this case, § 541(a)(l) is intended 
to include in the estate any property made available to the 
estate by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See 
H. R. Rep. No. 95--595, p. 367 (1977). Several of these pro-
visions bring into the estate property in which the debtor did 
not have a possessory interest at the time the bankruptcy 
proceedings commenced. 10 
Section 542(a) is such a provision. It requires an entity 
(other than a custodian) holding any property of the debtor 
that the trustee can use under § 363 to turn that property 
over to the trustee. 11 Given the broad scope of the reorga-
. action against third parties than those held by the debtor. See H. R. Rep. 
No. 95--595, pp. 367-368 (1977). These statements do not limit the ability 
of a trustee to regain possession of property in which the debtor had eq-
uitable as well as legal title. 
9 "The scope of this paragraph [§ 541(a)(l)] is broad. It includes all 
kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property, causes of ac-
tion (see Bankruptcy Act § 70a(6)), and all other forms of property cur-
rently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act." H. R. Rep. No. 
95--595, p. 367 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 82 (1978). 
10 See, e. g., §§543, 547, and 548. These sections permit the trustee to 
demand the turnover of property that is in the possession of others if that 
possession is due to a custodial arrangement, § 543, to a preferential trans-
fer, § 547, or to a fraudulent transfer, § 548. 
We do not now decide the outer boundaries of the bankruptcy estate. 
We note only that Congress plainly excluded property of others held by the 
debtor in trust at the time of the filing of the petition. See § 541(b); H. R. 
Rep. No. 95--595, p. 368 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 82 (1978). Al-
though it may well be that funds that the IRS can demonstrate were with-
held for its benefit pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7501 (employee withholding 
taxes), are excludable from the estate, see 124 Cong. Rec. 32417 (1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Edwards) (Service may exclude funds it can trace), the IRS 
did not attempt to trace the withheld taxes in this case. See Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 18, 28-29. 
11 The House Report expressly includes property of the debtor recovered 
under § 542(a) in the estate: the estate includes "property recovered by the 
trustee under section 542 . . . , if the property recovered was merely out 
of the possession of the debtor, yet remained 'property of the debtor."' 
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nization estate, property of the debtor repossessed by a se-
cured creditor falls within this rule, and therefore may be 
drawn into the estate. While there are explicit limitations 
on the reach of§ 542(a), 12 none requires that the debtor hold a 
possessory interest in the property at the commencement of 
the reorganization proceedings. 18 
As does all bankruptcy law, § 542(a) modifies the proce-
dural rights available to creditors to protect and satisfy their 
liens. 14 See Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 
H. R. Rep. No. 95--595, p. 367 (1977); see 4 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy 
11541.16, p. 541-72.10 (15th ed. 1982). 
12 Section 542 provides that the property be usable under § 363, and that 
turnover is not required in three situations: when the property is of incon-
sequential value or benefit to the estate, § 542(a), when the holder of the 
property has transferred it in good faith without knowledge of the petition, 
§ 542(c), or when the transfer of the property is automatic to pay a life in-
surance premium, § 542(d). 
18 Under the old Bankruptcy Act, a bankruptcy court's summary juris-
diction over a debtor's property was limited to property in the debtor's pos-
session when the liquidation petition was filed. Phelps v. United States, 
421 U. S. 330, 335-336 (1975); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 
U. S. 426, 432-434 (1924). Phelps, which involved a liquidation under the 
prior Bankruptcy Act, held that a bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to 
direct the Service to turn over property which had been levied on and 
which, at the time of the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, was in 
the possession of an assignee of the debtor's creditors. 
Phelps does not control this case. First, the new Bankruptcy Code 
abolished the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction, thus 
expanding the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts beyond the possession limi-
tation. H. R. Rep. No. 95--595, pp. 48-49 (1977); see Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,-- U. S. --, -- (1982) 
(plurality opinion) (slip op. 3). Moreover, Phelps was a liquidation situa-
tion, and is inapplicable to reorganization proceedings such as we consider 
here. 
14 One of the procedural rights the law of secured transactions grants a 
secured creditor to enforce its lien is the right to take possession of the 
secured property upon the debtor's default. Uniform Commercial Code 
§ 9--503, 3A U. L. A. 211 (1981). A creditor's possessory interest resulting 
from the exercise of this right is subject to certain restrictions on the credi-
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U. S. 273, 278-279 (1940). See generally Nowak, Turnover 
Following Prepetition Levy of Distraint Under Bankruptcy 
Code § 542, 55 Am. Bankr. L. J. 313, 332--333 (1981). In ef-
fect, § 542(a) grants to the estate a possessory interest in cer-
tain property of the debtor that was not held by the debtor at 
the commencement of reorganization proceedings. 16 The 
Bankruptcy Code provides secured creditors various rights, 
including the right to adequate protection, and these rights 
replace the protection afforded by possession. • 
c 
This interpretation of § 542(a) is supported by the section's 
legislative history. Although the legislative reports are 
silent on the precise issue before us, the House and Senate 
hearings from which § 542(a) emerged provide guidance. 
Several witnesses at those hearings noted, without contradic-
tion, the need for a provision authorizing the turnover of 
property of the debtor in the possession of secured credi-
tor's use of the property. See§ 9--504, 3A U. L.A. 256-257. Here, we 
address the abrogation of the Service's possessory interest obtained pursu-
ant to its tax lien, a secured interest. We do not decide whether any prop-
erty of the debtor in which a third party holds a possessory interest inde-
pendent of a creditor's remedies is subject to turnover under § 542(a). For 
example, if property is pledged to the secured creditor so that the creditor 
has possession prior to any default, 542(a) may not require turnover. See 
4 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy~ 541.08[9], p. 541-53 (15th ed. 1982). 
16 Indeed, if this were not the effect, § 542(a) would be largely superflu-
ous in light of § 541(a)(l). Interests in the seized property that could have 
been exercised by the debtor-in this case, the rights to notice and the sur-
plus from a tax sale, see n. 4, supra-are already part of the estate by vir-
tue of§ 541(a)(l). No coercive power is needed for this inclusion. The 
fact that § 542(a) grants the trustee greater rights than those held by the 
debtor prior to the filing of the petition is consistent with other provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code that address the scope of the estate. See, e. g., 
§ 544 (trustee has rights of lien creditor); § 545 (trustee has power to avoid 
statutory liens); § 549 (trustee has power to avoid certain post-petition 
transactions). 
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tors. 16 Section 542(a) first appeared in the proposed legisla-
tion shortly after these hearings. See H. R. 6, § 542(a), 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess., introduced January 4, 1977. See generally 
Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 
Am. Bankr. L. J. 275, 27~281 (1980). The section remained 
unchanged through subsequent versions of the legislation. 
Moreover, this interpretation of § 542 in the reorganization 
context is consistent with judicial precedent predating the 
Bankruptcy Code. Under Chapter X, the reorganization 
chapter of the Bankruptcy Act of 1878, as amended, 
§§ 101-276, 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (formerly codified as 11 
U. S.C §§5014>76 (1976 ed.)), the bankruptcy court could 
order the turnover of collateral in the hands of a secured 
_creditor. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Kaplan, 185 F. 
2d 791, 796 (CA11950); see In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 
198 F. 2d 703, 706 (CA2 1952); 6A J. Moore & L. King, Col-
lier on Bankruptcy~ 14.03, p. 741-742 (14th ed. 1977); Mur-
phy, Use of Collateral in Business Rehabilitations: A Sug-
gested Redrafting of Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 1483, 1492-1495 (1975). 
Nothing in the legislative history evinces a congressional in-
tent to depart from that practice. Any other interpretation 
of § 542(a) would deprive the bankruptcy estate of the assets 
and property essential to its rehabilitation effort and thereby 
would frustrate the congressional purpose behind the reorga-
nization provisions. 17 
16 See Hearings on H. R. 31 and H. R. 32 Before the Subcommittee on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess., 439 (1975) (statement of Patrick A. Murphy); id., at 
1023 (statement of Walter W. Vaughn); id., at 1757 (statement of Robert J. 
Grimmig); id., at 1823-1839 (remarks and statement of Leon S. Forman, 
National Bankruptcy Conference); Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before 
the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 (1975) (statement of 
William W. Vaughn); id., at 464 (statement of Robert J. Grimmig). In 
general, we find Judge Friendly's careful analysis of this history for the 
Court of Appeals, 674 F. 2d, at 152-156, to be unassailable. 
17 Section 542(a) also governs turnovers in liquidation and individual 
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We conclude that the reorganization estate includes prop-
erty of the debtor that has been seized by a creditor prior to 
the filing of a petition for reorganization. 
III 
A 
We see no reason why a different result should obtain 
when the IRS is the creditor. The Service is bound by 
§ 542(a) to the same extent as any other secured creditor. 
The Bankruptcy Code expressly states that the term "en-
tity," used in § 542(a), includes a governmental unit. 
§ 101(14). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. Moreover, Congress 
carefully considered the effect of the new Bankruptcy Code 
on tax collection, see generally S. Rep. No. 95--1106 (1978) 
(report of Senate Finance Committee), and decided to pro-
vide protection to tax collectors, such as the IRS, through 
grants of enhanced priorities for unsecured tax claims, 
§ 507(a)(6), and by the nondischarge of tax liabilities, 
§ 523(a)(1). S. Rep. No. 95--989, pp. 14-15 (1978). Tax col-
lectors also enjoy the generally applicable right under 
§ 363(e) to adequate protection for property subject to their 
liens. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or its legislative his-
tory indicates that Congress intended a special exception for 
the tax collector in the form of an exclusion from the estate of 
property seized to satisfy a tax lien. 
B 
Of course, if a tax levy or seizure transfers to the IRS own-
ership of the property seized, § 542(a) may not apply. The 
enforcement provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 
adjustment of debt proceedings under Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U. S. C. §§ 701-766, 1301-1330 (1976 ed., Supp. V). See 
§ 103(a). Our analysis in this case depends in part on the reorganization 
context in which the turnover order is sought. We express no view on the 
issue whether § 542(a) has the same broad effect in liquidation or adjust-
ment of debt proceedings. 
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1954, 26 U. S. C. §§ 6321-6326 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), do 
grant to the Service powers to enforce its tax liens that are 
greater than those possessed by private secured creditors 
under state law. See United States v. Rodgers,-- U. S. 
--,-- (1983) (slip op. 4); id., at--,--, n. 7 (dissent-
ing opinion) (slip op. 1, 6, n. 7); United States v. Bess, 357 
U. S. 51, 56-57 (1958). But those provisions do not transfer 
ownership of the property to the IRS. 18 
18 It could be argued that dictum in Phelps v. United States, 421 U. S. 
330 (1975), suggests the contrary. In that case, the IRS had levied on a 
fund held by an assignee of the debtor for the benefit of the debtor's credi-
tors. In a liquidation proceeding under the old Bankruptcy Act, the 
trustee sought an order directing the assignee to turn the funds over to the 
estate. The Court determined that the levy transferred constructive pos-
session of the fund to the Service, thus ousting the bankruptcy court of ju-
risdiction. 421 U. S., at 335--336. In rebutting the trustee's argument 
that actual possession by the IRS was necessary to avoid jurisdiction, the 
Court stated: "The levy ... gave the United States full legal right to the 
$38,000 levied upon as against the claim of the petitioner receiver." /d., at 
337. This sentence, however, is merely a restatement of the proposition 
that the levy gave the Service a sufficient possessory interest to avoid the 
bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction. The proposition is now irrele-
vant because of the expanded jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts under the 
Bankruptcy Code. See n. 13, supra. 
The Court in Phelps made a similar statement in discussing the trustee's 
claim that § 70a(8) of the old Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 110(a)(8) (1976 
ed.) (trustee is vested "with the title of the debtor as of the date of the 
filing of the petition . . . to . . . property held by an assignee for the benefit 
of creditors"), continued constructive possession of the property in the es-
tate, notwithstanding the pre-petition levy. 421 U. S., at 337, n. 8. The 
Court rejected this claim. It first cited the trustee's concession that the 
debtor had surrendered title upon conveying the property to the assignee, 
ibid., and held that, because the debtor did not hold title to the property as 
of the date of filing, the property was not covered by § 70a(8). The Court 
went on, however, to state that "the pre-bankruptcy levy displaced any 
title of [the debtor] and § 70a(8) is therefore inapplicable." Ibid. Because 
the initial conveyance of the property to the assignee was said to have 
extinguished the debtor's claim, this latter statement was unnecessary to 
the decision. To the extent, if any, that it conflicts with our decision here, 
82-21~PINION 
UNITED STATES v. WHITING POOLS, INC. 13 
The Service's interest in seized property is its lien on that 
property. The Internal Revenue Code's levy and seizure 
provisions, 26 U. S. C. §§6331 and 6332, are special proce-
dural devices available to the IRS to protect and satisfy its 
liens, United States v. Sullivan, 333 F. 2d 100, 116 (CA3 
1964), and are analogous to the remedies available to private 
secured creditors. See Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503, 
3A U. L. A. 211-212 (1981); n. 14, supra. They are provi-
sional remedies that do not determine the Service's rights to 
the seized property, but merely bring the property into the 
Service's legal custody. See 4 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation 
of Income, Estates and Gifts ~ 111.5.5, p. 111-108 (1981). 
See generally Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Prob-
lems, pt. 1, 13 Tax L. Rev. 247, 272 (1958). At no point does 
the Service's interest in the property exceed the value of the 
lien. United States v. Rodgers, --U.S., at--,--
(slip op. 12); id., at-- (dissenting opinion) (slip op. 12); see 
United States v. Sullivan, 333 F. 2d, at 116 ("the Commis-
sioner acts pursuant to the collection process in the capacity 
of lienor as distinguished from owner"). The IRS is obli-
gated to return to the debtor any surplus from a sale. 26 
U. S. C. § 6342(b). Ownership of the property is trans-
ferred only when the property is sold to a bona fide purchaser 
at a tax sale. See Bennett v. Hunter, 9 Wall. 326, 336 (1870); 
26 U.S. C. §6339(a)(2); Plumb, 13 Tax. L. Rev., at 274-275. 
In fact, the tax sale provision itself refers to the debtor as 
the owner of the property after the seizure but prior to the 
sale. 19 Until such a sale takes place, the property remains 
the debtor's and thus is subject to the turnover requirement 
of§ 542(a). 
we depart from it. 
19 See 26 U. S. C. § 6335(a) ("As soon as practicable after seizure of prop-
erty, notice in writing shall be given by the Secretary to the owner of the 
property"), and § 6335(b) ("The Secretary shall as soon as practicable after 
the seizure of the property give notice to the owner"). 
• . • t 
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When property seized prior to the filing of a petition is 
drawn into the Chapter 11 reorganization estate, the Serv-
ice's tax lien is not dissolved; nor is its status as a secured 
creditor destroyed. The IRS, under § 363(e), remains enti-
tled to adequate protection for its interests, to other rights 
enjoyed by secured creditors, and to the specific privileges 
accorded tax collectors. Section 542(a) simply requires the 
Service to seek protection of its interest according to the con-
gressionally established bankruptcy procedures, rather than 
by withholding the seized property from the debtor's efforts 
to reorganize. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered . 
25 , 1983 
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